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Editors’ Introduction
THE QUESTION OF MODERNITY MEETS
THE QUESTION OF LEO STRAUSS
The present volume consists of eleven chapters coming from papers prepared 
by a number of different scholars invited to participate in a conference on the 
legacy of Leo Strauss. The conference was held at the Jagiellonian University in 
Krakow, Poland, on June 4-5, 2009. The title of this book is the same as the title 
of the conference.
* * *
We are modern people. We fi nd ourselves gathered “in the same boat” moving 
towards a hopefully better future. Our destination may appear to be a fi nal state, 
a universal and homogeneous one, where the most important question is found 
to be resolved. That is the question, “How to live?” It was brought to light and 
explicated by the philosophers of the Socratic tradition. They bequeathed to us 
some truth about humanity itself, namely about the man who is participating in 
a constant struggle to answer the question, “How to live?” However, insofar as 
the question proves to be “infi nite, absolute,” it cannot be answered in a defi nite 
way. The fi nal state marking its fi nal resolution has in fact never come and is nev-
er to come, indeed. But what if we are taught, or learned, undoubtedly to believe 
that it really exists or just emerges from the course of history? Even granted the 
Socratic truth, is there still enough space within the domain of humanity for our 
leading truly different ways of life? Is being a poet, or a prophet, not to mention 
being a philosopher in a very Socratic sense, something still possible and acquir-
able for us moderns? Is a political science stemming from the philosophic and 
poetic consciousness of the most important question still to be exercised?
There have been rather few authors capable of writing on such issues. Cer-
tainly one of them is Leo Strauss. But he is also a controversial fi gure in the eyes 
of many scholars and readers who often hear of him as a founder of a mysterious 
sect or an intellectual “godfather of the neoconservative movement.” To be sure, 
what cannot be forgotten is that during his lifetime Strauss was relatively neglect-
8ed by his fellow academics or even somewhat derided by them especially because 
of his manner of reading “esoterically” and his emphatic criticism against the 
positivist approach in social science. He was also a teacher, and a teacher genu-
inely loved by his students, of a large group of political scientists who then have 
tried to continue the detailed research into the history of political philosophy. 
Their studies of political phenomena have thus turned out completely different 
from the studies carried out by most of the specialists in their branch of study. In 
such a context, Strauss’s pupils or followers might have felt almost persecuted. 
All in all, it has become arguable whether Strauss can primarily be perceived as 
a profound thinker and not as a “founder” or “godfather;” or if one is able to read 
his texts with a kind of successful patience, but alone, to train one’s mind under 
his books, and fi nally to grasp some fundamental questions that he was concerned 
with, without being actually involved in the “Straussian school.” And yet, as the 
intellectual as well as political climate has begun to change, when a heterogene-
ity of the social sciences has generally been proclaimed and some new striking 
challenges in the realm of politics and society and culture have been noticed, the 
thinking of Leo Strauss returns to us not just as an eccentric effort in understand-
ing a deep past but as a lively Socratic struggle to understand life itself.
So in the recent years the question of modernity as raised by Strauss, along 
with the whole theological-political dimension that should be gained through 
thinking on the “modern solution” we now seem to experience, aroused much 
interest in the United States and some, too, in Western Europe. There were many 
stages of debate with highly differentiated levels of profundity. Very little of it has 
been, however, recognized and seriously understood in Poland. This book was 
born out of our intellectual desire that has originated some time ago, during our 
studies that took place at the Jagiellonian University in the old beautiful city of 
Krakow. Then we encountered some questions about main tenets and sources of 
what can be called the modern way of life, and began to seek possible answers in 
wise books. We may, moreover, have felt ourselves witnesses to a great political 
and social change: It seemed that in our country the “process of transformation” 
had been by and large completed as Poland fi nally joined the European Union in 
2004. So it was our personal experience that made us inclined to raise the subject 
of modernity and put it into the context of the legacy of Leo Strauss.
The title of this volume seems to suggest that modernity is irremediably fl awed 
or devoid of something of utmost importance. But is the answer to the question of 
what has been lost ready at hand? Someone familiar with the elaborate arguments 
of the discontents of modernity might react with a feeling of dismay. After all, 
has not the situation of the modern man been analyzed endless times with the use 
of such prolifi c concepts as “disenchantment,” “rationalization,” “mass culture,” 
“one-dimensionality,” “commercialization,” etc? But to dismiss this question 
simply on the basis that it has been raised too frequently would not be intellectu-
ally responsible. All the more so since in the case of Strauss’s intellectual legacy 
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the problem of modernity is being posed in such an insightful way that shuns 
all categories. But in what sense is our intimation of modernity’s insuffi ciency 
defensible? It seems that we are led toward this problem as soon as we begin to 
grasp the simple fact of living in the world that has come to be almost unanimous 
with regard to any relevant concept of best regime. Sixteen years after Strauss’s 
death the liberal-democratic model has been declared victorious and the idea of 
promoting it worldwide has been put on the top of the agenda. The vital question 
is, however, whether liberalism really permits many different ways of life to be 
exercised within it; it may also be true that the prevalent model of society works 
in such a way that a particular model of culture is being imposed on us, notably 
in the fi eld of political discourse; the model that excludes from the outset and in 
the long run even destroys many ways of life which do not conform to it; and that 
a real tension between human beings disappears insofar as there is only one way 
of being “correct.” It is thus clear that by pointing to the concerns in question we 
point toward something that goes beyond the discussion about the pros and cons 
of liberal democracy. It would be presumptuous to believe that the current em-
brace of the liberal-democratic model of culture has defi nitely settled the question 
of how to live. 
One of Strauss’s great achievements is certainly connected with his steadfast 
allegiance to that Socratic question. Strauss might have been afraid of moder-
nity’s silencing of this question, i.e., that a problem of man’s good life would no 
longer be approached as the problem. And if the Heideggerian narrative develops 
the thesis that the history of Western metaphysics accounts for the forgetfulness 
of the question of Being, in Strauss modernity seems to bear responsibility, to 
some extent, not only for lowering man’s goal, but also for doing away with the 
question, “How to live?” The complete oblivion of this question seems to be an 
unavoidable consequence of the coming into existence of a universal and homog-
enous state. Strauss saw this clearly in his famous debate with a renowned French 
philosopher and one of the European “founding fathers,” Alexandre Kojève. For 
in a universal and homogenous state there would be no place for an inquiring 
philosophy in the Socratic sense; in such a state the most urgent questions are 
once and for all abolished by the fi nal wisdom and the wisdom wins absolutely 
over philosophy. The shadow cast by Kojève’s vision of the fulfi llment of history 
certainly informs Strauss’s concern with the consequences of modernity. Moder-
nity conceived in terms of radical immanence, complete reconciliation with the 
world, and oblivion of eternity, seems to provide conditions particularly fi t for 
a thorough oblivion of the Socratic question.
If modernity threatens to silence the most important question, it seems all the 
more important to show that the contemporary answers fall short of being self-
evident. The importance of the so-called theologico-political problem becomes 
more crucial if viewed from this perspective. By confronting philosophy and the 
revealed religion, i.e., by juxtaposing the irreconcilable claims of Athens and Je-
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rusalem and sharpening their contours, Strauss succeeds in putting into focus the 
grounds of our action, or in other words, the question, “Who is to be obeyed?” 
when it comes to leading one’s life. However, there is much more to it than that. 
Strauss not only recalls the most important Western alternative concerning the 
way of life; the way he does it seems to involve a claim that the very possibility of 
raising that question depends on the existence of genuinely possible options or al-
ternatives. Were this tension to disappear completely, the question “How to live?” 
would lose its urgency. In this sense one can say that Strauss’s apprehension con-
cerning modernity corresponds somehow to that formulated by Nietzsche. In the 
Preface to Beyond Good and Evil Nietzsche wrote that “the splendid tension in 
the spirit, something unlike anything existing on earth before” arose as a conse-
quence of “the fi ght against the thousands of years of pressure from the Christian 
church.” According to him there have been two attempts “in the grand style” to 
unbound the string and ease the spirit’s tension: Jesuitism and the Democratic En-
lightenment. He avers that the free spirits, who are neither Jesuits nor Democrats, 
still have “the need, the entire spiritual need, and the total tension of its bow.” 
Without attempting to write Strauss into the Nietzschean vocabulary or even phi-
losophy, one can justly say that Strauss understands the crucial role played by this 
tension of the spirit. For if the West owes its vitality to the antagonism between 
Athens and Jerusalem, philosophy or the philosophic way of life is in need of 
self-assertion and rational justifi cation in the face of its most serious competitor, 
namely the life based upon recognizing the supreme authority of the Revelation. 
While any desire to stay confi ned within a faith proves fatal to any philosophy, 
being confronted with faith proves ultimately salutary to philosophy. As Strauss 
concludes, “No one can be both a philosopher and a theologian, nor, for that mat-
ter, some possibility which transcends the confl ict between philosophy and theol-
ogy, or pretends to be a synthesis of both. But every one of us can be and ought 
to be either one or the other, the philosopher open to the challenge of theology or 
the theologian open to the challenge of philosophy.”
The defense of philosophy may be judged as Strauss’s major intellectual task. 
The life he lived and the books he left may provide strong evidence for answer-
ing the question regarding the very possibility of the philosophic life today in 
the affi rmative. But what are the most characteristic features of the philosophic 
life? Strauss, as can be learned from the present volume, studied both philosophy 
and poetry. The latter sometimes has the ability to voice something essential that 
searches deeper than some elaborate enunciations. We cannot here refrain from 
letting poetry speak about philosophy in this respect. It would not be presumptu-
ous to suggest that a poem by Zbigniew Herbert, one of the most important Polish 
authors living in the age of the communist rule, beautifully depicts the ideal of 
philosophic life that had been held dear by Strauss:
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Mr. Cogito
always defended himself
against the smoke of time
he valued concrete objects
standing quietly in space
he worshipped things that are permanent 
almost immortal
dreams about the speech of cherubs
he left in the garden of dream
he chose
what depends
on earthly measures and judgment
so when the hour comes
he can consent without a murmur
to the trial of truth and falsehood
to the trial of fi re and water
(The Adventures of Mr. Cogito with Music,
translated by John and Bogdana Carpenter)
After having listened to the poet let us turn to the works of the scholars whose 
articles form the content of this volume. The arrangement of the chapters is 
based on the following idea. The fi rst part of the book may be referred to as 
“Leo Strauss Reconsidered” and consists of fi ve chapters dwelling on the major 
themes in Strauss’s thought. The second part, comprised of four chapters, may 
be labeled “Leo Strauss Encountered” as it attempts to explore Strauss’s legacy 
against the backdrop of some of his major disputants. The third part may be de-
scribed as “Leo Strauss Reread” as it consists of two chapters: the fi rst one deals 
with Strauss’s art of reading (or “learning by reading”) in the context of post-
modern challenge and the second one provides an example of an insightful art of 
reading. We believe that such an arrangement lends the book coherency that will 
allow the reader to grasp the thread leading from the essential question “Why Leo 
Strauss?” to the controversy over treatment of the text, the controversy which is 
nowadays considered crucial.
Heinrich Meier in the chapter entitled Why Leo Strauss. Four Answers and 
One Consideration concerning the Uses and Disadvantages of the School for the 
Philosophical Life claims that the question “Why Leo Strauss” can be answered 
separately from the recent Strauss boom in media. He unfolds his answer to the 
question posed at the very beginning into four answers. The fi rst answer is that 
Strauss opened up a new historical and philosophical access to the history of phi-
losophy by making us aware of the exoteric-esoteric way of writing and thereby 
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its signifi cance in gaining the proper understanding of the history of philosophy. 
The second answer is that Strauss points to the fact that philosophy is a way of life 
and not merely a set of doctrines. The third answer is that Strauss places political 
philosophy at the center of philosophy. Because political philosophy confronts 
seriously the question what is right, it becomes the locus of philosophy’s refl ec-
tion on itself. Political philosophy is responsible for defense of philosophy and its 
rational justifi cation; in political philosophy the whole of philosophy is at stake. 
The fourth answer is that Strauss made the theologico-political problem his main 
theme. The rational justifi cation of philosophy presupposes its confrontation with 
its strongest antagonist: the challenge of revelation; and no more powerful objec-
tion to philosophy exists than objection based on the faith in an omnipotent God. 
Meier’s conclusion is that the possibility to turn from the history of philosophy to 
the intention of the philosopher may allow us to come to the insight that “leaving 
the historical cave” is always possible.
Daniel Tanguay in the chapter entitled Leo Strauss and the Contemporary 
Return to Political Philosophy discusses Strauss’s assessment that today political 
philosophy is in a state of decay or putrefaction. It seems that this state of things 
has changed in the last thirty years due to revival of political philosophy (in France 
called Renouveau de la philosophie politique). According to him this simplistic 
picture of revival must be qualifi ed in a few respects. He poses the question: 
“Is Strauss’s judgment invalidated by this renewal?” Strauss regarded political 
philosophy as an attempt to answer two closely connected questions: “What is 
the best regime?” and “What is the best life?” The knowledge of human nature is 
necessary in order to judge which political regime is the best regime, which is at 
the same time “conducive to human excellence.” Strauss distinguished between 
the best regime (a combination of “way of life” and “form of government”) which 
is noble and just, and many legitimate regimes which are only just. According to 
Strauss modern political thought has blurred the distinction between legitimate 
and best regime. Modern natural law focuses on the conditions of legitimacy of 
a regime and not on the quest for the best regime. Strauss asked the question of 
the best regime and against this backdrop we can see how his renewal of political 
philosophy differs from other similar attempts in recent times. Almost all con-
temporary political philosophers believe that there is no serious alternative to the 
democratic regime. Contemporary political philosophy is a theory of democracy. 
Tanguay claims that this situation may be considered a complete departure from 
the traditional political philosophy.  
Nathan Tarcov begins his chapter entitled Philosophy as the Right Way of Life 
in Natural Right and History with a remark that one of the most salient themes in 
Strauss’s thought is the conception of philosophy as a way of life. This concep-
tion contrasts with the contemporary approach to philosophy as merely a branch 
of research. Strauss states in his response to historicism that philosophy in its 
original (Socratic) sense is the awareness of the fundamental problems and the 
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fundamental alternatives regarding their solution. Modern philosophy is politi-
cized because it wants to establish the best order while original philosophy was 
rather humanizing since it did not put itself in the service of such actualization. 
The difference between philosophers and intellectuals corresponds to the differ-
ence between philosophers and gentlemen and between philosophers and soph-
ists or rhetoricians. Granted that philosophy has awareness of its limits, it can 
answer the Socratic question of how to live because it is a way of life devoted to 
the quest for knowledge or wisdom. This “Socratic answer” remains in a peren-
nial confl ict with “the anti-Socratic answer.” Tarcov discusses the relation be-
tween philosophic questioning and the divine law and between the philosopher 
and popular opinion. The philosopher’s ascent from the cave and his descent into 
the cave is discussed here in detail against the backdrop of the dependence of 
the philosophic life on the city. The chapter ends with asking a few compelling 
questions regarding the very possibility of choosing the philosophic way of life 
as one’s own way of life.  
David Janssens begins his chapter entitled The Philosopher’s Ancient Clothes. 
Leo Strauss on Philosophy and Poetry with a remark that we can distinguish 
three quarrels in the work of Leo Strauss: 1) between Athens and Jerusalem, or 
reason and revelation; 2) between Ancients and Moderns; 3) between philoso-
phy and poetry. He argues that the third quarrel deserves more attention than it 
has received up till now. His aim is to draw our attention to the importance of 
ancient poetry for Strauss’s understanding of the art of writing of the classical 
philosophers. According to him Strauss took the third quarrel no less seriously 
than the others. He argues that Leo Strauss had become increasingly doubtful 
whether there is a quarrel between poetry and philosophy (as famously declared 
by Plato). Janssens’s main thesis is that ancient philosophy is fundamentally in-
debted to ancient poetry. As an example may serve the well known fact that the 
word “nature” (phusis) appears in Homer’s Odyssey. Strauss discovered that the 
famous Greek historians such as Herodotus, Thucydides or Xenophon were not 
interested in merely recording the events. Their true aim was protreptic: to help 
attentive readers to free themselves from the authoritative opinions and arrive 
at a genuine education (paideia). Janssens avers that Strauss’s refl ection reached 
a point where the distinction between poets, historians, and philosophers seems 
to dissolve. In order to gain the proper understanding of Plato we have to study 
the writings of the pre-Platonic poets and historians. When viewed from the per-
spective of the art of writing (Platonic “noble lies” and Hesiodic-Homeric “tales 
similar to the truth”) the similarities between poets and philosophers seem to be 
striking. One of the most important similarities between the two can be seen in 
their ministerial and not autonomous character: they lead men to the understand-
ing of the human soul.
Paweł Armada in the chapter entitled Leo Strauss as Erzieher: The Defense of 
Philosophical Life or the Defense of Life Against Philosophy claims that the ques-
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tion that seems to underlie Strauss’s oeuvre is the question of an inevitable con-
fl ict between politics and philosophy (and these two terms have to be understood 
as the two ways of life). This can be also depicted in classical terms as a problem 
of relation between “the cave,” which means the political community, on the one 
hand, and the struggle to ascend from the cave, led by Socratic philosophers, on 
the other hand. We may thus say that the conditio sine qua non of philosophy is 
the cave itself. If so, the defense of the philosophic way of life should be prima-
rily understood as the defense of a necessary ground for any possible philosophi-
cal enterprise or, to put it in other words, of the commonsensical perception of 
political things which has something to do with the faith in divine source of the 
law of a particular community. From a certain point of view, a Straussian depic-
tion of what philosophy originally was, of Socrates’ way of life, may be construed 
as embarrassingly idealistic. Armada presents Strauss’s judgment of the “modern 
solution” as being contra naturam. The natural conditions are to be found only 
within closed societies, not a world-state but, Strauss admits, this natural order 
cannot be simply restored in the extremely unfavorable situation that we experi-
ence today. Armada concludes that Strauss’s fi gure of Socratic philosopher as 
an educator is deliberately idealized in order to redeem the claims of politics or 
political life or maybe human life as such. He views the Straussian concern about 
politics as substantially preceding the concern about the philosophic life as as-
cribed to Nietzsche. In other words, living in the cave comes before living “under 
the sky.” And even with the highest estimation for the philosophy as it may be, as 
prudent as detached or concerning about the eternal, there is still a need for the 
law given by a (serious and sensible) prophet-legislator.
Jürgen Gebhardt in the chapter entitled Modern Challenges – Platonic Re-
sponses: Strauss, Arendt, Voegelin discusses Leo Strauss in the company of such 
thinkers as Hannah Arendt, Eric Voegelin, and Michael Oakeshott. All of them 
reacted to the crisis of the European world. Gebhardt claims we can see that the 
theoretical understanding behind the works of the thinkers in question is that 
of Plato’s image of the city. They focused on the critical understanding of the 
disorder of their times. He speaks in terms of “platonic responses” because all 
these thinkers created a paradigm of order based on their refl exive understand-
ing of the human predicament or a conception of representative humanity in the 
sense of the refl exive paradigm of the platonic city. The debate on the so-called 
decline of political theory that began in the 1950s and allegedly ended in 1971 
with Rawls’s A Theory of Justice was an intellectual blunder partly due to plain 
ignorance, but also to the fact that many of the thinkers in question were Ger-
man émigrés formed by the German philosophy and representing an orientation 
that might have been threatening to some basic premises of American political 
science. These thinkers differed signifi cantly, but one can discern certain agree-
ments. Strauss analyzed the crisis of modernity using the three-wave hypothesis 
and focusing on the Machiavellian modifi cation of a pre-modern political phi-
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losophy. Voegelin presented a description of a civilizational drama that ended 
up in the totalitarian execution of an inner-worldly eschatology emerging from 
sectarian Christianity (the thesis of the Gnostic character of modernity). Arendt, 
in turn, regarded the crisis as primarily political and having its roots in the demise 
of the Roman trinity of religion, tradition, and authority. The four did not work 
out blueprints for direct political action, but evoked the unseen measure that is 
indispensible as an ordering force in the life of citizens.
Arkadiusz Górnisiewicz in his chapter entitled Karl Löwith and Leo Strauss 
on Modernity, Secularization, and Nihilism explores Strauss’s and Löwith’s 
views of modernity with a particular emphasis put on the notions of “seculari-
zation” and “nihilism.” He claims that at a fi rst glance their stances on moder-
nity seem to be quite similar: same dissatisfaction with the outcome of modern 
civilization, its soullessness, its conquest of nature, same rejection of the prevail-
ing historicist understanding of man. Modernity for Strauss constitutes above 
all a break with the classical thinking. Strauss speaks in terms of the project of 
modernity: modernity is not a by-product of some objective processes or the de-
velopment of Hegelian Spirit, but rather it was actualized by the means of some 
positive project. In turn, Löwith elaborates the problem of modernity not on the 
plane of political philosophy, but on the plane of philosophy of history. Löwith 
conceives modernity not as a radical break, but in terms of the persistence of the 
basic eschatological pattern after which the secularized modern philosophies of 
history are fashioned (the secularization thesis).  He focuses on the demise of the 
cosmological refl ection which brings forth existentialism and historicism. Both 
Strauss and Löwith claim that modernity ended up in a crisis which may be called 
nihilism. The recognition of the crisis of modernity led them both to refl ect on the 
possibility of return. But the problem of return is ambiguous since the Western 
civilization consists of two main elements: the Bible and Greek philosophy, or 
in a more metaphorical language: Jerusalem and Athens. In turn, for Löwith the 
problem of return emerged not in the form of the confl ict between Jerusalem 
and Athens, but above all in the form of two interpretations of nihilism given by 
Kierkegaard and Nietzsche. The chapter analyzes the grounds of their rejection 
of the homogenous and universal state.
Emmanuel Patard begins his chapter entitled Remarks on the Strauss-Kojève 
Dialogue and Its Presuppositions with brief remarks on the current grave state 
of the modern project of universal Enlightenment. Alexandre Kojève, the famous 
commentator of Hegel, still stood for the modern project, the aim of which he 
called “universal and homogeneous State,” the End-State which is supposed to 
fulfi ll the fundamental aspirations of Man, to solve all contradictions and confl icts 
in human thought and action. Kojève challenged On Tyranny, Leo Strauss’s de-
fense and illustration of the classical view of the fundamental problems through 
a commentary on Xenophon’s Hiero. Kojève’s critical review was for Strauss 
a fi tting opportunity to confront the philosophical quarrel between Ancients and 
Moderns, in a “Restatement” which appears to be the most extensive and the 
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deepest reply to the critiques which have been addressed to his achievement. In 
the famous concluding paragraph of his “Restatement,” Strauss stated the con-
fl icting presuppositions of his discussion with Kojève. Patard discusses the debate 
in a detailed way. Kojève equated Hegel’s key statement “Geist ist Zeit” with the 
following one: “Man is Time,” Time exists insofar there is History, i.e., human 
existence, driven by Desire (oriented toward future: what is absent, present inso-
far it is absent), Desire of Desire (desire as constituting man in his humanity, i.e., 
anthropogenic desire), “Man is Desire for Recognition,” and eventually the “his-
torical evolution which fi nally comes to the universal and homogeneous State.” 
Patard discusses the problem of the last men with regard to the universal and 
homogenous state and the grounds of Strauss’s objection to it. He also draws our 
attention to the fi nal, well-known sentence from Strauss’s concluding paragraph 
that clearly alludes to Heidegger’s revival of the question of Being (Seinsfrage), 
and it implies that a common agreement between Strauss and Kojève against 
Heidegger is crucial in their debate.
Piotr Nowak in his chapter entitled Carl Schmitt and his Critic claims that 
Carl Schmitt, like Hobbes before, was considered to be an intellectual pariah for 
many years. According to him Hobbes and Schmitt certainly share a few con-
cepts, fi rst formulated by Hobbes and then fi lled with new meaning by Schmitt 
such as bellum omnium contra omnes, “protection in exchange for obedience,” 
“man is a wolf to another man.” The two authors shared the anthropological 
axiom – similar understanding of human nature, of its evil character. Nowak 
discusses a masterly critique of Schmitt by Leo Strauss. For Hobbes, the state of 
nature is a constant struggle against adversity, against physical and social power, 
the infl uence and wills of other people. In this sense, the state of nature is impos-
sible. One cannot live in such conditions. According to Schmitt, however, the 
state of nature does not concern individuals but separate totalities, states which 
have deadly enemies (deadly – because a political confl ict is always a struggle 
for life and death) as well as potential allies and neutral states. The state of na-
ture defi ned in this way is not a fi ction. However it may become a fi ction when 
the world is completely depoliticized. Hobbes pictured the mechanics and the 
workings of the power apparatus of the modern state. According to Nowak it was 
Schmitt who penetrated the beast from the inside and who found the direct op-
posite of the Leviathan.
Till Kinzel in his chapter entitled Postmodernism and the Art of Writing: The 
Importance of Leo Strauss for the 21st Century speaks about Strauss within the 
context of postmodernism in order to highlight today’s very strong prejudices to 
Strauss’s understanding of philosophy. These obstacles are based on the extreme 
historicism or culturalism that is dominant in the current academic discourse and 
which denies any transcultural standards as well as the ability to overcome the 
limitations of time. The thought of Michel Foucault or Jacques Lacan claims 
something contrary to Strauss, namely that writers are not masters of their words 
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but rather the servants of some mysterious unconscious that speaks through them. 
Kinzel stresses the importance of Leo Strauss whose work presents a serious 
challenge to the reigning orthodoxies about how to read texts. Strauss rejected the 
current presupposition that the “humanities” always historicize and the dogma 
that denies the very possibility of philosophy in the original sense. Strauss’s con-
ception of philosophy aims to preserve an awareness of the necessity not to stop 
thinking, which is identical with asking questions. These questions in turn always 
imply the crucial questions “Why philosophy?” and “What is philosophy?” And 
these questions cannot be questions about anything, but about most important and 
weighty matters. Strauss takes up Plato’s famous allegory and talks about the so-
called second cave into which we have fallen. The second cave of which Strauss 
speaks in the 1930s constitutes our modern predicament which is an unnatural 
situation. It is necessary to use (and it is paradoxical) unnatural means to retrieve 
something of the natural horizon that constitutes the starting point for philoso-
phy as originally understood. We can try to ascend from the cave by means of 
“lesendes Lernen” (learning by reading). So the task of philosophical education 
for the 21st century may thus well be to teach students the art of reading. Kinzel 
concludes emphatically: Reading is a form of action in behalf of philosophy: 
Legere est agere.
The last chapter entitled Leo Strauss’s Gynaikologia, written by Laurence 
Lampert (who himself could not be present at the conference), gives a signifi cant 
example of an art of reading deeply inspired by Strauss’s concept of esoterism. 
Lampert refers to the two late books by Strauss that convey Xenophon’s picture 
of Socrates. The method he uses is a kind of very careful exegesis whose aim 
consists in recovering the twofold meaning of the text; an exegesis that should be 
considered an invitation to study the text in order to confi rm or refute the claims 
made by the commentator. Thus, from Lampert’s point of view, a philosophic 
text is esoteric, which means that it “has hidden marvels” for the most selected 
audience. According to him, such an art of esoteric writing was practiced by the 
classic pupil of Socrates as well as by Strauss philosophically commenting on 
his works. Now, the title “gynaikologia” is given by Strauss and it covers four 
chapters containing Socrates’ narration of his conversation with Ischomachos. 
These are: Marriage according to the gods and according to the law (Chapter 
VII); Order, I (Chapter VIII); Order, II (Chapter IX); Cosmetics (Chapter X). 
Lampert shows that Strauss’s commentary deliberately refl ects the structure of 
Xenophon’s book. Not leaving the plane of exegesis he expresses the suggestion 
that “Xenophon’s mature Socrates offered his teleotheology” (with this term, also 
coined by Strauss, meaning that “Socrates teaches a theology and a cosmology 
that maintain that gods manage a cosmos end-directed for human benefi t”) “as 
Plato’s mature Socrates offered his doctrine of ideas;” they occur to be the teach-
ings susceptible to “diffi culties or logical refutation, but salutary or useful for 
young gentlemen and prospective philosophers.” In Lampert’s words, “while the 
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peculiarly Socratic philosophizing was taken up in various ways by Xenophon, 
Plato, and Aristotle it remained a never ceasing consideration of nature and hu-
man nature sheltered behind a salutary teaching on nature and human nature that 
it knew to have diffi culties.” Then it seems that we are left with a fundamental 
question of the philosopher’s ability and willingness to create a new political or-
der to replace a dying world he still lives in, or some new values regarding gods 
and virtue to be pursued, by means of his salutary teaching on human nature. 
* * *
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